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“Die Schriftstellerei wird erst durch den Erfolg als freier Beruf möglich; 
der Erfolg sagt jedoch nichts über den Wert einer Schriftstellerei aus, er deutet 
allein darauf hin, dass der Schriftsteller eine Ware herstellt, die sich verkaufen 
lässt: Dass dieser Umstand nicht befriedigt, sei zugegeben.”1 
 
(Writing becomes only possible as an independent profession because of 
the success; but the success reveals nothing about the value of the writing, it 
only indicates that the writer produces a commodity which can be sold: that 
this fact is not satisfactory must be conceded.) 
 
Friedrich Dürrenmatt (1921–1990), Swiss writer and playwright 
I.  INTRODUCTION: SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
The economic analysis of law and legal institutions, or the law-and-
economics movement, originally a distinct North American phenomenon that 
emerged in the 1960s,2 has become a widespread tool for a certain 
conceptualisation and understanding of legal problems.  Prominent 
representatives of the law-and-economics approach especially regard 
intellectual property as a “natural field for economic analysis of law.”3  Since 
its inception, this form of analysis has been met with suspicion, as it was felt 
that law-and-economics tried to take over other social sciences and establish a 
kind of “economics imperialism.”4  This criticism has to be taken seriously 
because the law-and-economics analysis does not only reconceptualise 
otherwise dissimilar fields of knowledge in a rather unrecognisable way to the 
“home-grown” researchers of the other fields, it also alters, deforms, or even 
destroys the object of research because it has a strong normative element, 
even where it presents itself as purely descriptive5 or (which amounts to the 
same) “positive.”6  This is particularly true of intellectual property law as the 
 
1.  FRIEDRICH DÜRRENMATT, DENKANSTÖSSE 125 (1989) (author’s translation from 
German). 
2.  CENTO G. VELJANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW-AND-ECONOMICS: A RESEARCH REVIEW 5 
(1982). 
3.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEG. STUD. 325, 325 (1989). 
4.  Discussion by Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 
1, 8 (1969) who also uses this term. 
5.  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987). On the descriptive, as opposed to the normative, law and 
economics analysis, see VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 24–26. 
6.  On the concept of “positive economics,” see Milton Friedman, The Methodology of 
Positive Economics, in THE METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
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research object of an economic analysis because all areas of law have 
developed their long-standing and highly elaborate methodology and do not 
need a new one, developed for an entirely different discipline, to describe 
their objects of research.7  The purpose of an economic analysis can only be a 
change of current legal institutions and decisions according to perceived 
superior economic considerations, so every law-and-economics analysis is 
ultimately normative.8  Otherwise, it would be superfluous for economists 
because they take legal institutions (e.g., the legal institutions of contract and 
property, or regulatory rules) for granted when they seek to explore market 
phenomena and economic behaviour, and it would be superfluous for lawyers 
because they have their own conceptual and scholarly frameworks of legal 
institutions and decisions. 
The law-and-economics approach, seeking to belong to economics as well 
as to law but arguably belonging to neither, engrafts economic research 
methods on law; it wants to provide a scientific theory to predict the effect of 
legal sanctions on behaviour, whereby these sanctions are conceptually 
simplified as prices because people are supposed to respond to sanctions in 
the same way as to prices.  Economics then claims to have mathematically 
precise theories (e.g., price theory, game theory) and empirical methods for 
the analysis of the effects of prices on behaviour.9  The ways of modelling, 
also mathematical modelling, are controversial within economics itself,10 but 
the complexities of human economic behaviour and of the causes and effects 
of human endeavours require a simplification through modelling which 
enables scientific findings.  In economics, that can often lead to the 
 
MILTON FRIEDMAN LEGACY 7 (Uskali Mäki ed., 2009).  
7.  On the more suitable humanist disciplines for the understanding of law and legal culture, 
see Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 6 DUKE L.J. 929, 942–
44 (1986). See also Anne Barron, Copyright infringement, “free riding” and the lifeworld, in 
COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 93, 125–27 (Lionel Bently, Jennifer 
Davis & Jane Ginsburg eds., 2010), suggesting Habermas as a better starting point for a social theory 
than law-and-economics. On the logical and rhetorical aspects of legal reasoning, see Peter Goodrich, 
Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language, 4 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 
88, 117–120 (1984). 
8.  Cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2–3, 7 (1997) (2d ed.) who 
say effectively that. 
9.  See id. at 2.  
10.  See David F. Hendry, Preductive Failure and Econometric Modelling in 
Macroeconomics: The Transactions Demand for Money, in ECONOMIC MODELLING. CURRENT 
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN MACROECONOMIC MODELLING IN THE UK AND IN THE US 217–222 (Paul 
Ormerod ed., 1979), for a discussion on the need to monitor, revise, and reconstruct economic 
models to avoid or collect model mis-specification in relation to demand for money functions.  See 
Erich W. Streissler, “i.i.d.” or: On So-called Precise Statements in Economics, in HOW TO 
FORECAST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS DURING AND AFTER CRISES 75–90 (E. Streissler & G. 
Tichy, eds., 2012), for a criticism of the shortcomings of economic models.  
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development of a mathematical equation whereby the economist has to admit 
that he will never be able to determine the numerical values of the parameters 
in such a formula.11  Reductionist models are necessary to manage the 
complexities of reality and to gain a better understanding, but if the model 
simplifies so extremely such that the connection with reality can hardly be 
made out,12 the scientific exercise is worthless for the purpose of legal 
policy.13  Unlike “pure” economists, adherents of the law-and-economics 
approach appear to be far more insouciant in this regard.  Furthermore, an 
economic analysis of the law influences the object of the examination, the law 
itself, or at least the perception of the law.  One can illustrate the problem of 
some approaches of the law and economics analysis with a slightly 
exaggerated example: A researcher wants to study the social behaviour of rats 
interacting with each other, but, to simplify the complexities of that behaviour 
for a greater chance of making scientifically verifiable empirical observations, 
he takes one single rat, kills it according to the devised scientific model for 
simplification purposes, and then describes the rat’s behaviour with earnest 
scientific accuracy as motionless, perhaps assisted by the empirical methods 
of statistics and econometrics.  The economic analysis of intellectual property 
law often provides good examples for such a “dead rat” approach. 
The following discussion is a fundamental critique of the application of 
the law-and-economics analysis to intellectual property law from a lawyer’s 
viewpoint.  Economists have also raised concerns,14 most notably Coase: 
Since the people who operate in the economic system are the same 
people who are found in the legal or political system, it is to be 
expected that their behaviour will be, in a broad sense, similar. But it 
 
11.  Friedrich A. Hayek, The Theory of Complex Phenomena, in READINGS ON THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 61–63 (Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre eds., 1964). 
12.  Cf. Balkin’s criticism of the extreme law-and-economics reductionism (here in the 
context of tort law).  See J. M. Balkin, Book Review Essay: Too Good to be True: The positive 
economic theory of law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1471 (1987):  
Different visions of human nature and different moral concerns that give rise to a 
multiplicity of doctrines all must be shoehorned into the model and reexplained as facets of 
a unitary principle.  Thus, the reductionist strategy views conflict and diversity as mere 
appearance when in fact they may be fundamental features of legal thought. 
13.  If one follows Friedman’s method of Positive Economics, then the model assumptions 
are supposed to be unimportant, only the methodological correctness of the conclusions is relevant: if 
the conclusions lead to an acceptable economic prognosis that is not falsified, then it is irrelevant 
whether the assumptions have been realistic.  See Friedman, supra note 6, at 14–15, 30–34, 41–42.  
For any meaningful guidance in legal policy this approach is unsuitable. 
14.  On the criticism by economists of the extension of economics to “non-market” 
economics, that is (in the present context) law, see Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics 
Movement, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1987), trying to refute their arguments. 
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by no means follows that an approach developed to explain behaviour 
in the economic system will be equally successful in the other social 
sciences. In these different fields, the purposes which men seek to 
achieve will not be the same, the degree of consistency in behaviour 
need not be the same and, in particular, the institutional framework 
within which the choices are made are quite different. It seems to me 
probable that an ability to discern and understand these purposes and 
the character of the institutional framework (how, for example, the 
political and legal systems actually operate) will require specialized 
knowledge not likely to be acquired by those who work in some other 
discipline. Furthermore, a theory appropriate for the analysis of these 
other social systems will presumably need to embody features which 
deal with the important specific interrelationships of that system. 15 
Coase’s view is important here since he became the originator of the 
prevailing law-and-economics theory of property.16  The following is not a 
rejection of an economic method for the analysis of economic phenomena 
which presuppose, or have been created by, the law, such as supply and 
demand on the market, which requires at least contract and property rights (or 
intellectual property rights) for its functioning.17  But it is a rejection tout 
court of the remodelling of legal institutions and decisions in accordance with 
certain scientific methods and paradigms developed in (and for) economics, 
and of the claim that a corresponding analysis could yield any epistemic value 
for the law and a normative standard of efficiency for future legal policy.  The 
critique also disagrees with the idea that we are supposed to have an 
“economic theory” of property rights, of crime and punishment, of privacy, 
and so on.18 
Law-and-economics seems to take the worst of both worlds.  Economics 
tends to be descriptive and seeks to ascertain rules of patterns of economic 
behaviour, which, usually after modelling and a partial analysis,19 may be 
expressed in mathematical equations.  A necessary consequence of this 
 
15.  Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 201, 208 
(1978). 
16.  Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960). 
17.  COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 45 (2011). ALAIN 
SUPIOT, THE SPIRIT OF PHILADELPHIA 43 (2012). Economists tend to recognise that implicitly only.  
See, for example, OLIVIER J. BLANCHARD AND STANLEY FISHER, LECTURES ON MACROECONOMICS 
465–466 (1992), for an instructive type of discussion on the goods market.  The law is incidentally 
referred to as a factor for the possibility of demand shifts having no effect on prices. 
18.  See, e.g., Posner, supra note 14, at 1. 
19.  At least with regard to microeconomic neo-classical models, and these are the starting 
point for law-and-economics approaches. 
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scientific approach is a plurality of different models for different aspects of 
the economy and/or different, also contradicting, models and outcomes in 
relation to one distinct phenomenon.  This unavoidable plurality of models 
and theorems alongside one another is characteristic of economics but is 
discarded in the law-and-economics analysis.  The reason is sociological.  As 
one of the most important protagonists of the law-and-economics movement 
candidly stated, a motivation for the emergence of the law-and-economics 
approach was “that many law professors have lost interest in the traditional 
undertakings of legal research”.20  But the law-and-economics researchers are 
for the most part still lawyers.  Law, unlike economics, does not entertain a 
plurality of different scientific approaches and models but provides 
authoritative answers and decisions, either by a lawgiver in statutes, by judges 
in judgments, or, in addition, particularly in Civil Law countries, prevalent 
opinion by eminent legal academics.  Law-and-economics renounces the 
plurality of economics and takes the authoritative singular approach of law 
and, at the same time, uses the arguably unsuitable scientific methods of 
economics since they were developed for economic, not legal, problems.  
While unsuitable and wrong approaches are cut to size within the multitude of 
equal methods and models in economics, or can be reviewed in appeals in 
law, the law-and-economics analysis seems to be an authoritative method with 
no established mechanism of review or criticism.  Although it sometimes 
embraces mathematics and statistics to reinforce its scientific credibility,21 it 
rather appears to be a method based more on unchallengeable ideological 
belief than on falsifiable science.22  However, because of this effectively non-
plural approach in law-and-economics, this critique can confine itself to the 
Chicago School of Law-and-Economics as the principal and most relevant 
approach and can ignore possible other versions of law-and-economics 
methods as negligible variants, at least from a “classical” lawyer’s 
perspective. 
What I will discuss here first is an outline of the law-and-economics 
modelling of property rights and intellectual property rights, which law-and-
economics regards as following from traditional property rights (especially 
 
20.  Richard A. Posner, The Costs of Accidents–A Legal and Economic Analysis by Guido 
Calabresi (Review), 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 636 (1970). 
21.  Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 
905–06, 912 (1980). 
22.  Although appearing scientifically detached law-and-economics is not value free: on the 
underlying ideology of the Chicago School of Law-and-Economics which is arguably conservative, 
see Balkin, supra note 12, at 1447; Horwitz, supra note 21, at 911–12; C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology 
of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 47–48 (1975). 
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tangible property).23  This is correct, though for reasons of law and legal 
theory, that is, property theory,24 not as a result of economic theory devised by 
law-and-economics.  Then I discuss the argumentation against a law-and-
economics approach for a conceptualisation of intellectual property.  The 
objections to a law-and-economics analysis of legal institutions and legal 
relations, and, consequently, to economic propositions with regard to legal 
reform, are threefold.  First, the conditions and assumptions on which the 
proposed economic models rest are oversimplifying, distorting, incomplete 
and sometimes blatantly incorrect.  Secondly, even if correct conditions and 
model criteria can be developed, they are still unable to translate legal 
institutions and legal relations into an economic abstraction as a true mirror 
image of the law and its actors25 because economic considerations are by 
definition largely irrelevant to the lawyer for a legal decision.  Thirdly, the 
application of a law-and-economics approach to legal decision-making, either 
in the context of principally law enforcement (e.g., judicial decisions) or of 
law making (e.g. legal policy), can have questionable and morally 
reprehensible effects.26  All three objections are obviously interrelated, but 
they are discussed separately for more clarity.  The first concern, the artificial 
assumptions for the design of economic models that seek to emulate legal 
institutions and relations, will also be presented with regard to the specific 
types of intellectual property rights individually: trademarks, where a law-
and-economics method may be most acceptable, though often one may 
question its relevance; patents, where this method is more problematic; and, 
finally, copyrights, where the law-and-economics analysis is not just a “dead 
rat” approach, but rather seems to destroy this legal institution. 
 
23.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (5th  ed. 1998). 
24.  Andreas Rahmatian, Intellectual Property and the Concept of Dematerialised Property, 
in MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361, 368–371, 372 (Sue Bright ed., 2011). 
25.  See SUPIOT, supra note 17, at 42–44, 73–74, against the belief in the purportedly supreme 
rules of “the market,” which supposedly determine every aspect of human behaviour and interaction. 
On the often bizarre assumptions made about the human behaviour of (economic) actors and the 
world they act in, see the pointed summary by Mark G. Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A 
Critique of the Core Premises of “Law and Economics,” 33 J. LEG. EDUC. 274, 275 (1983): (a) all 
human behaviour is utility-maximizing of selfish, privatized individuals, (b) every good thing in life 
has a resource cost which must be ascertained, (c) for most goods of interest, demand curves are 
downward sloping, so increase of price reduces demand, (d) legal commands can best be thought of 
as prices. 
26.  See also ANDREAS RAHMATIAN, COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY: THE MAKING OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CREATIVE WORKS 92, 95, 253 (2011). 
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II.  THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROVIDED 
BY LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 
Law-and-economics analysis of property rights presumes that legal 
protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources 
efficiently.27  The efficiency criteria have originally been determined 
according to the Pareto-optimality: a society has not reached its optimal 
position if there exists at least one change which would make someone in that 
society better off and no one in it worse off.  Thus an alternative is Pareto-
efficient if and only if it is not possible to make some individual better-off 
without making anyone worse-off.28  This concept of efficiency is connected 
to the model of perfect competition,29 an assumption that individuals 
maximise utility, that firms maximise profit, that no individual seller or buyer 
has the ability to influence the commodity price by his or her actions, that 
products are homogenous, that all resources enjoy free mobility, and that there 
is complete information about market opportunities.30  The Pareto test seems 
to presume no transaction costs, or, as others have said, is supposed to apply 
even with transaction costs.31  In any case, it is too rigid because it effectively 
precludes any policy change as it invariably harms at least one person’s 
interest, and the welfare of one individual cannot be compared to that of 
another.32  Law-and-economics analysis therefore uses mostly the Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency criterion instead:33 a policy is efficient if those who gain can, 
in principle, compensate those who lose to their satisfaction and yet remain 
still better off than before the change.34 
What “efficiency” means in a law-and-economics analysis, especially in 
the context of the efficient exploitation of resources through property rights, is 
controversial.  If viewed according to Pareto-efficiency criteria, the allocation 
of resources that improve some persons’ welfare without any reduction in 
those resources of others could be said to be efficient35  Or, rephrased by 
Calabresi and Melamed in the light of the Kaldor-Hicks criteria, “[e]conomic 
 
27.  POSNER, supra note 23, at 36. 
28.  See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 
YALE L.J. 1211,  1215 (1991); SATISH K. JAIN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (Satish K. Jain ed., 2010). 
29.  See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, ROBIN WELLS, KATHRYN GRADDY, ECONOMICS (EUROPEAN 
EDITION) 212 (2008). 
30.  See, e.g., VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 35.  
31.  Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1215, referring to Coase. 
32.  VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 37; Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1216. 
33.  See J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 700–01 
(1939). 
34.  VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 37; Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1221; JAIN, supra note 
28, at 4–5, RICHARD O. ZERBE, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (2001). 
35.  JAIN, supra note 28, at 5. 
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efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that 
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further 
change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that 
they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than 
before.”36  Another expression of efficiency that has been put forward is 
wealth maximisation.37  There are variations of this cost-benefit analysis, 
usually variants and improvements of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test, in that 
the Kaldor-Hicks test is supplemented by further criteria, such as: 
information, individual psychology of decision making (especially how gains 
and losses are subjectively perceived), costs of change, values, and so on.38  
However, despite such efforts, the efficiency criteria remain arbitrary and 
flexible.39 
Externalities can adversely affect the efficiency of the market in the 
allocation of resources.  There is negative externality if the person who causes 
harm as a result of his activity does not incur costs because of this activity: the 
typical example is the pollution of the environment by a factory if that factory 
is not liable for such an emission.  (There is positive externality if someone 
benefits from an activity without facing a cost, for example the benefit for 
tourists because of the countryside protection by farmers’ activities).  
Externalities, therefore, create a divergence between private cost and social 
cost.  They are characterised by being incidental to some other market activity 
and by being unpriced.40  Coase suggested a solution to this problem in a 
seminal article in 1960, which particularly initiated the law-and-economics 
analysis of property rights. 
Coase discusses the divergence between private and social cost in 
opposition to the traditional treatment of this problem by Pigou.41  In case of 
emission of smoke or other nuisance, for example, the question is not how to 
restrain the person causing the nuisance.  Rather, the problem is reciprocal.  
Which choice is to be made to reach better market efficiency (in line with the 
Kaldor-Hicks criteria): should A, who is causing the nuisance, be allowed to 
harm his neighbour B and, therefore, not be stopped, or should B be allowed 
 
36.  Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (1972). 
37.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 281, 291 (1979). Discussion in VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 38. This term has been proposed 
by Posner, and, according to his view, is identical with the Kaldor-Hicks test, see ZERBE, supra note 
34, at 5. 
38.  ZERBE, supra note 34, at 17–27. 
39.  VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 39. 
40.  N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 204–19 (5th ed. 2009), on patents 
specifically at 209; JAIN, supra note 28, at 7; VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 44. 
41.  Coase, supra note 16, at 1. 
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to harm A so A has to be stopped?42  If there were costless market 
transactions, the decision of the courts concerning tortious liability would be 
without effect on the allocation of resources.  For example, a factory may be 
faced with the choice to pay $1,000 for the pollution the smoke causes, or 
$400 to its neighbours for the purchase of a dryer each so they can dry the 
laundry indoors without it getting dirty, or $300 for the installation of a 
smokescreen.  The last option would be the most efficient one for the factory.  
There would be the same outcome if there were no legal prohibition against 
pollution, so legal provisions would not affect the efficient outcome in a 
situation of zero transaction costs (this is sometimes called the simple form of 
the Coase Theorem).43  However, the assumption of zero transaction costs is 
entirely theoretical.  There are realistically always transaction costs 
(communication, dispute resolution costs, operation of a market, 
establishment of a government department, etc.),44 and these are no different 
from any other costs.45  Analysis of divergence between private and social 
cost should examine the effects of a proposed policy change and should 
attempt to decide whether the new situation would be better or worse than the 
original one.  It may also be possible to modify legal arrangements between, 
for example, the factory causing the pollution and its neighbours by means of 
a bargain between the parties.  Rights (for example the right to create smoke) 
can be regarded as factors of production.  The right to do something with 
harmful effect is a cost, a loss which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of 
the exercise of that right.46  When transaction costs are sufficiently high to 
prevent bargaining, the efficient use of resources depends on the way in which 
property rights are assigned.  So, in the case of positive transaction costs, 
there may not be an efficient outcome under every legal rule.  The preferred 
legal rule is the one that minimises the effects of transaction costs (sometimes 
referred to as the second part, or corollary, of the Coase Theorem).47  A legal 
rule prohibiting nuisance or pollution should be assessed according to these 
criteria; the absence of such a rule could be more efficient. 
Having taken Coase’s economic analysis of nuisance rights as a basis, 
Demsetz proposed an economic theory of property rights in general.48  He 
 
42.  Id. at 2. 
43.  Id. at 10; A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13–14 
(3d ed. 2003). 
44.  Coase, supra note 16, at 44.  For a detailed discussion of transaction costs, see 
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 84. 
45.  Coase, supra note 16, at 15; Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1218. 
46.  Coase, supra note 16, at 9, 43–44. 
47.  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 82; POLINSKY, supra note 43, at 15. 
48.  Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
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developed a theory of efficient use of resources through appropriate 
assignment of property rights.  According to Demsetz, property rights 
constitute incentives to achieve a greater internalisation of externalities.  
Every cost and benefit associated with social interdependencies is a potential 
externality.  A harmful or beneficial effect turns into an externality if the cost 
of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting 
persons is too high to make it worthwhile.  A process, in this context usually a 
change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear on all interacting 
parties is referred to as “internalization” of such effects.49  Thus, the main 
allocative function of property rights is the internalisation of externalities 
(beneficial and harmful effects with too high of a cost to make the decisions 
worthwhile); “property rights develop to internalize externalities when the 
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”50  This 
economic model of property rights presupposes that (a) harmful and 
beneficial effects of alternative uses of property rights will be brought to bear 
on their owners, (b) the property owners are utility maximisers and will use 
property rights efficiently, and (c) the mix of output that is produced will 
generally be independent of the distribution of property rights among 
persons.51 
Demsetz assumes that private property rights and private ownership of 
land internalizes many of the external costs that would be associated with 
communal ownership.  For example, an owner A of a communal right starts 
constructing a dam on adjacent land which another communal owner B would 
like to have stopped.  In case of communal ownership, A may agree not to 
continue constructing the dam but cannot guarantee that a third communal 
owner will not start building a dam because A has no exclusive rights which 
entitle him to stop.  If there is private ownership, he could, and the negotiation 
cost for B would be greatly reduced because he would not have to negotiate 
with a number of communal owners and would avoid an increase in the cost 
of internalizing.52  Demsetz tentatively suggests the application of the same 
principles to patents and copyright: if a new idea is freely appropriable to all, 
there would be no incentives for developing such ideas, but the incentive 
would be increased if the originators of these ideas obtained private property 
rights.53 
The Chicago School has applied this cost-benefit analysis for private 
 
49.  Id. at 348. 
50.  Id. at 350. 
51.  Harold Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. L. & ECON. 61, 62 (1966).  The 
last criterion in particular echoes the Coase Theorem. 
52.  Demsetz, supra note 48, at 357. 
53.  Id. at 359. 
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property rights to develop an economic theory of intellectual property rights.  
However, the theoretical conditions discussed here have not always been 
followed closely.  One often finds general statements, such as “the social 
benefits of property rights must be balanced against the costs,” applied (with 
qualifications) to intellectual property.54  The rather loose and impressionistic 
use of efficiency criteria, which are then applied to concrete issues, such as 
term of protection, search and transaction costs, or fair use,55 is characteristic 
of the law-and-economics theory of intellectual property.  This can be 
observed when one studies the individual economic cost-benefit analyses of 
the separate intellectual property rights. 
III.  TRADE MARKS 
Presumably the least problematic intellectual property right for a law-and-
economics analysis is the trademark right. It appears that the discussion has 
only the registered trademark in mind, and it would indeed be more difficult 
to squeeze the unregistered, passing-off protected, trademark into an 
economic model.  Landes and Posner present perhaps the best-known 
comprehensive law-and-economics interpretation of trademarks.  According 
to these authors, the economic benefit of trademarks consists in the reduction 
of consumer search costs.  This presupposes that the producer of trademarked 
goods maintains a consistent quality over time and across customers.  So the 
consumer can economise on real cost, and because he spends less time 
searching to get the quality he wants.56  The authors also provide a formal 
mathematical model for consumer search costs: firms with strong trademarks 
will charge higher prices for their brands, not as a result of any market power, 
but because the search costs associated with their trademark will be lower.  
This model presumes that all firms produce products or brands of identical 
quality.57  Another benefit of trademarks within the “market in languages” is 
that trademark protection creates an incentive to invest in the invention of 
new words.  This is connected with the requirement of distinctiveness of 
trademarks; particularly, once a trademark becomes generic, it loses 
distinctiveness and is no longer protected.58  One test for whether a trademark 
 
54.  Richard A. Posner, The law and economics of intellectual property, 131 DAEDALUS 5, 6–
7 (2002). 
55.  See, e..g., Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 
19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 57 (2005); Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and 
Marks, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 119–21 (1990); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An 
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991). 
56.  Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 269, 275. 
57.  Id. at 277, 279–80. 
58.  For the EU: see First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, art. 3(1)(b) and (d), art. 12(2)(a) 
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has become generic is whether the word constituting the trademark appears in 
a dictionary.59 
Other commentators have added that the economic function of trademarks 
also consists in facilitating competition and being a structuring device in the 
organisation of the production and distribution.60  Thus, the trademarks do not 
only reduce search costs, but also increase “dynamic efficiency” (efficiency 
understood according to the Kaldor-Hicks criteria) because producers will 
seek to develop an improved version of the product that the consumers, being 
mindful of the trademark, will then purchase because they cannot distinguish 
the new version from the older, inferior one (but they may otherwise be risk-
averse in relation to hidden product changes61); trademarks therefore 
encourage innovation.62  However, as part of a social cost analysis, the use of 
a trademark should be considered in relation to the costs that third parties 
would incur through being unable to make use of trademarks as a tool of 
communication.  This consideration should be part of the assessment of 
likelihood of confusion and trademark dilution when the economic efficiency 
of trademarks is evaluated.63 
There is the possibility that trademarks facilitate competition and reduce 
consumer search costs, but that does not apply generally.  Here, one can only 
touch upon the notorious problem of how the term “competition” is to be 
interpreted.  What is meant in the present context is probably not the 
equilibrium of perfect competition in neo-classical economics, but rather what 
Adam Smith understood as competition: an economic evolution that assumes 
increasing returns.  These, in turn, prompt merchants and manufacturers to 
develop and exploit opportunities provided by the economics of scale and by 
specialisation or division of labour.  Competition is an activity rather than a 
(static) structure.64 
The assumption of the reduction of consumer search costs through 
trademarks presupposes a rationality of the consumer, which is often artificial 
in a trademark context.65  This starts with a too narrow interpretation of the 
 
1989 O.J. (L040) 1 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks. 
59.  Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 296. 
60.  Andrew Griffiths, A Law-and-Economics perspective on trade marks, in TRADE MARKS 
AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 243 (Lionel Bently, Jennifer Davis, & Jane C. 
Ginsburg eds., 2008). 
61.  On risk aversion in general, see Cooter and Ulen, supra note 8, at 45. 
62.  Griffiths, supra note 60, at 244 n.14, 247 (discussing allocative efficiency: Pareto 
efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
63.  Griffiths, supra note 60, at 256–64, with examples from case law of the ECJ/CJEU. 
64.  George B. Richardson, Adam Smith on Competition and Increasing Returns, in ESSAYS 
ON ADAM SMITH 354, 359 (Andrew S. Skinner & Thomas Wilson eds., 1975). 
65.  The idea of rational behaviour is generally a contested assumption in economics. See, 
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function of trademarks as indicators of origin and quality.  In fact, trademarks 
rather have a communication, advertising and differentiation function,66 
whereby the origin or quality of the trademarked goods or services is in the 
background or irrelevant altogether.  A law-and-economics analysis that 
stresses that trademarks are also a structuring device in the organisation of the 
production and distribution acknowledges to some extent the reduced 
importance of the origin function;67 one only has to think of the many 
differently trademarked types of toothpaste which are all produced by the 
same cosmetics corporate group.  A trademark may also indicate quality, but 
not necessarily a good quality; “quality” as such is a neutral term.68  
Furthermore, the quality aspect may often rather be irrelevant to the 
consumer, especially where the reputation of the trademark is built on a 
psychological appeal, which may defy economic rationality.  Here, the 
consumer may also rely (unknowingly) on health and safety and consumer 
protection laws, which operate independently from trademark law and secure 
a minimum health and safety standard.  A typical example is perfume if one 
looks at the production costs and, in comparison, the retail prices which 
consumers are willing to pay.  The issue of search costs reduction according 
to the law-and-economics model does not apply in these—practically very 
common—cases.  Either, the customer looks out for a familiar perfume, for 
example, in which case there may be a reduction in search cost because it is 
easier to find the product again, but this contributes hardly to an economically 
efficient behaviour overall; one is willing to pay for a product which is 
overpriced (in relation to the cost of production, etc.) because of its 
trademark.  Or, equally often, the trademark informs the consumer of the 
existence of the product that the consumer did not know of, in which case 
search costs would not have arisen in the first place.  It is not surprising that 
in those branches of commerce where the differentiation and communication 
function usually eclipses the origin and quality function of the trademark, in 
the perfume, cosmetic and fashion industries and the spirits industry, branding 
and trademarks are most aggressively asserted and defended because 
 
e.g., Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93(2) THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 163 (2003). See also Lionel Robbins, The Nature of Economic Generalisations, 
in PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 39–40 (F. Hahn & Martin Hallis eds., 1979). 
66.  WILLIAM CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OMNIPRESENT, DISTRACTING, 
IRRELEVANT? 89–90 (2004).  Instructive on the function of trademarks from the perspective of an 
economist is Jonathan Aldred, The economic rationale of trade marks: and economist’s critique, in 
TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 268–73 (Lionel Bently, Jennifer 
Davis & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2008). 
67.  Griffiths, supra note 60, at 243. 
68.  Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Mark Infringement as a Criminal Offence, 67(4) MODERN 
LAW REVIEW 680 (2004). 
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ultimately it is the trademark and the goodwill, not the nature and quality, of 
the product that constitutes the value.  It becomes apparent that the theory of a 
reduction of search costs, where applicable at all, is too one-dimensional and 
should be reconceptualised. 
In this light, the assertion that firms with strong trademarks will charge 
higher prices for their brands because the search costs associated with their 
trademark will be lower69 becomes doubtful.  As has been said, search costs 
may not necessarily arise, and the willingness to pay a disproportionately high 
price may be the result of the strong trademark and the non-rational, mental 
associations of the consumers, rather than a reduction of the search costs the 
trademark is supposed to have lowered.  One can, of course, redefine “rational 
economic behaviour” and “efficiency” and so cater for trademarks whose 
power lies mostly in their psychological appeal, but that would turn the terms 
“rationality” and “efficiency” into malleable and ultimately meaningless 
concepts.  Furthermore, the law-and-economics proponents do not provide a 
specific argument against the rather obvious contention that (strong) 
trademarks may not promote, but stifle, competition because they create 
monopolies and so cause deadweight costs and monopoly rents based on a 
spurious notion of product quality.70  With regard to well-known trademarks, 
there can also be the effect that the communication function of the mark leads 
to an avoidance of the corresponding products: the consumer decides not to 
buy products with the trademark in question because of different personal 
preferences.71  So the strong trademark may even increase search costs 
because they become avoidance costs. 
Furthermore, the consumer may differentiate products due to personal 
preferences, which may be prompted by the trademark itself but are otherwise 
unrelated to the quality or general properties of the trademarked products.  
This can be the case with so-called Veblen goods, which are bought for 
boasting and status although they are more expensive, and, as an anomaly in 
microeconomics, their demand tends to rise with a price increase.72  
 
69.  Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 277, 279. 
70.  Id. at 275.  Landes & Posner just reply to this argument: “A longer answer, which we 
shall merely sketch, is that the hostile view of brand advertising has been largely and we think 
correctly rejected by economists.”  Id. 
71.  This has to be distinguished from George Akerlof’s argument that trademarks are a 
counteracting institution against the effects of quality uncertainty because the consumer will refuse to 
buy the trademarked product in the future if it has not met the customer’s quality expectations.  See 
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84(3) THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 500 (1970).  However, in the present example the 
customer does not buy the trademarked product in the first place. 
72.  See, e.g., Aron O’Cass & Hmily McEwen, Exploring consumer status and conspicuous 
consumption, 4(1) JOURNAL OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 27, 29 (2004); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE 
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Trademarks are particularly relevant in this context because goods are often 
turned into Veblen goods through their prestigious trademark.  For example, 
two T-shirts may have been manufactured in the same East-Asian 
“sweatshop” and are of the same quality, but one bears a well-known and 
high-status trademark and is sold (successfully) for a ten-times higher price.  
Here, the trademark may have reduced search costs (depending on the 
individual situation) but has overall triggered a consumer behaviour at odds 
with rational economic efficiency.  One of the most curious irrational 
phenomena is that consumers are willing to pay a significantly increased price 
for a garment with its prominently affixed trademark, but they do not seem to 
consider charging the trademark-owning company for the advertising as living 
billboards.73  Again, the economic model of the trademark as reducing 
consumer search costs based on a premise of consumer rationality is too 
simplistic. 
The concept of “dynamic efficiency”74 is also problematic.  It conflicts 
with the presumption that consumers are rational actors of the market with 
complete information.  In this scenario the trademark misleads consumers: 
they buy the product because they may think that the product is of the same 
quality, given that it bears the same trademark.  Perhaps the product has really 
been improved, but in any case it has changed while the trademark pretends it 
has not.  Or, consumers expect an improvement, which they associate with the 
goodwill of the trademark, but in fact the product has not changed.75  In which 
way should such an arrangement promote innovation?  It is also difficult to 
see how this idea can be reconciled with the supposedly fundamental concept 
of an economic analysis of property rights: the concept of the internalisation 
of externalities, that is, social costs, for the purpose of greater efficiency, 
which is supposed to be achieved by property rights,76 here trade mark rights. 
Where the model of economic analysis of trademark rights detaches itself 
completely from reality is when it starts developing concepts of “markets in 
 
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS 75, 87, 96, 99 et passim 
(1957). 
73.  Andreas Rahmatian, Psychological Aspects of Property and Ownership, 29(3) 
LIVERPOOL LAW REVIEW 296 (2008). 
74.  Griffiths, supra note 60, at 244, 247. 
75.  Such a scenario of information asymmetry can lead to market failure according to the 
theory Akerlof developed in relation to the second-hand car market, see Akerlof, supra note 71, at 
488.  But Akerlof sees trademarks as a counteracting measure against the effects of quality 
uncertainty because the trademark gives the consumer a means of retaliation.  If the quality does not 
meet expectations, the consumer will refuse to buy the trademarked product in the future.  Id. at 499–
500. 
76.  Demsetz, supra note 48, at 348, 350. 
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language” and “efficient market rules.”77  One may note, here, that the 
“dictionary test” for whether a trademark has become generic is in striking 
contrast to the mathematical precision with which the authors try to prove the 
search cost reduction effect of trademarks.78  Dictionaries often list words that 
are considered to be (still) valid trademarks with an ® to avoid possible 
litigation,79 but they may also make incorrect assumptions either way. 
Despite all these concerns in the area of trademark law, a law-and-
economics analysis can reflect legal and economic realities.  Whether it 
increases our knowledge significantly is debatable.  Arguably, a lawyer and 
policy maker does not need a complex, mathematically enhanced, economic 
model to arrive at the rather general conclusion that trademarks may be able 
to reduce consumer search costs and facilitate competition under certain 
circumstances. 
IV.  PATENTS 
The picture changes when one looks at patents.  Here, an economic 
analysis can become positively harmful to the institution of patent law and its 
legal objectives.  The main reason may be that patents, unlike trademarks,80 
have the essential, but unpredictable, element of human inventiveness and 
creativity at their core, and that cannot be evaluated in economic models, 
probably not even with complicated risk assessment theorems. 
Patents are usually regarded as the prime example of a monopoly right.  
The classical liberal approach has been suspicious of the monopolising effect 
of the patent.81  Adam Smith accepted it as the lesser evil because the patent 
 
77.  Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 271–72. 
78.  Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 275–80. 
79.  Under § 16 of the German Trade Marks Act 1994, the trademark owner can compel the 
publisher of a dictionary to indicate that the word in question is a registered trademark. 
80.  Trademarks are arguably the most commercial/business-oriented and least inventive 
among the intellectual property rights.  The only inventive or creative element—the design of the 
trademark—characteristically obtains protection by copyright (as an artistic work), and that different 
protection right becomes eclipsed by the trademark protection proper.  The problem of potential 
overlap is, however, relevant in infringement actions because of trademark parody.  In that situation, 
the permitted acts (parody, criticism, and review, etc.) under the copyright laws would theoretically 
apply, and they are more generous than defences under trademark law.  However, the French courts, 
for example, keep the intellectual property rights separate and do not allow copyright-based defences 
in trademark infringement claims, see Christophe Geiger, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression - 
The Proportionality of Criticism, 38 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION LAW 317, 325 n.36 (2007). 
81.  Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or 
Monopoly? 13 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 911–15 (1990); Kitch, supra note 
55, at 122–23. 
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protects and promotes innovation.82  From a modern economist’s point of 
view (and that is most relevant in the present context), patents are not per se 
monopolies in an economic sense,83 although they may be used to establish 
economic monopolies.84  The exclusive right that the proprietary nature of the 
patent right confers cannot be equated with a monopoly as an economist 
understands it:85 therefore, the expressions “monopoly right” or “legal 
monopoly right” as different terms for “property right” should not be used to 
avoid confusion.86 
Law-and-economics analysis regards patent law as preventing “others 
from reaping where they have not sown.”  It promotes R&D investment 
because it confers an exclusive (property) right to the investors that enables 
them to recover the costs of invention.  If a firm were unable to recover the 
costs of the invention because the information relevant to the invention were 
open to all, the level of innovation would be lowered to a suboptimal level.87  
According to Kitch, the patent system offers a particular opportunity to 
develop a known technological possibility; it is a “prospect” with associated 
probabilities of costs and returns.  Such “a patent ‘prospect’ increases the 
efficiency with which investment in innovation can be managed.”  In this 
way, the patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximise the 
value of the patent without the danger of appropriation of the corresponding 
information by competitors.  A patent system also reduces the cost for the 
owner of technological information as a result of contracting with other firms 
that possess complementary information and resources (for example, funding 
for innovation investments).  Furthermore, patents have an information 
function so that the risk of duplication of investments in the same type of 
innovation is being reduced.  Finally, patents reduce the cost of maintaining 
control over technology and improve the structure of the returns to innovation 
 
82.  ADAM SMITH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, Book V, ch. 1, pt. 3, at 754 (Roy H. Campbell & Andrew S. Skinner eds., 1976) (The 
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. 2) (1st ed. 1776). 
83.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (1990); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent 
Law, 23(1) THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 249–50 (1994). 
84.  Hence, for example, the antitrust legislation of the EU in relation to the abuse of a 
dominant position of a patent holder.  See Art. 102 in connection with Arts. 34 and 36 of the TFEU.  
In the U.S., see Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also MARIATERESA MAGGIOLINO, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST. A COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF US AND EU 
LAW 54–84, 92 (2011). 
85.  See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).  For a discussion of the relevant cases, see Dam, supra note 83, at 269–270. 
86.  This is particularly true of copyright, but the same consideration applies to patents.  
RAHMATIAN, supra note 26, at 34–35. 
87.  Dam, supra note 83, at 247. 
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by providing a uniform structure of incentives.88 
While the advantages of the patent system Kitch sets out are in some 
respects not particularly controversial, they are not (and arguably cannot be) 
sufficiently concrete to give guidance in cases of conflict that lawyers and 
courts face.  Furthermore, some criteria do not seem to be specifically 
“economic” (“information function,” which is as much a sociological and 
psychological criterion as it is an economic one) and appear, rather, as 
embellished renderings of the status quo for the purpose of its justification.  It 
is notoriously difficult to provide indubitable empirical evidence to confirm 
the assertions that the patent system increases investment efficiency and, 
therefore, the incentive to invest, or that it reduces contracting costs with 
firms possessing complementary information or resources (a variant of the 
idea of internalisation of externalities through contracts).89 
When these general statements have to be translated into practical 
examples, one does not quite know whether one needs these broad principles 
at all, or even whether one wants to use them as a yardstick.  If they are 
applied in an examination of the validity of an existing patent, then one 
becomes uncomfortable if the decision is supposed to be determined by the 
question whether the patent is commercially successful.90  This may be an 
economically relevant criterion but should not be a legally relevant one.91  
One also arrives at peculiar and unsatisfactory results if the relevant criterion 
for ascertaining novelty of an invention is the “prospect” that a patent (if 
granted) would confer, the opportunity to develop technological possibilities, 
with associated probabilities of costs and returns.  Accordingly, the relevant 
test is not supposed to be whether the invention is worth a monopoly (the 
 
88.  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266, 276–79 (1977).  
89.  See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics 
Approach, 12 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW 291, 301 (1988–89), Maggiolino, supra note 84, at 16–21.  
Copyright does not fare better with regard to copyright in musical works.  “The emergence of formal 
copyright law was undoubtedly important for composers as well as for their publishers.  But it 
remains unclear whether changes in copyright law elicited systematic changes in the choice of 
composing as a vocation.”  FREDERIC M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES. THE 
ECONOMICS OF MUSIC COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 196 
(2004).  
90.  See Kitch, supra note 88, at 283 (qualifying some of the court decisions in the U.S. in this 
regard). 
91.  It is not in the U.K. with regard to inventive step.  The challenge of validity (lack of 
novelty, inventive step) of the patent typically happens in infringement actions.  Whether an 
invention is obvious does not depend on whether it has had (immediate) commercial success.  See 
Mills & Rockley (Electronics) v. Technograph Printed Circuits [1969] FSR 239, at 250.  The House 
of Lords decision, [1971] FSR 188, affirming the Court of Appeal, does not discuss this point 
specifically. 
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classical patent “reward” idea), but whether the invention is information 
whose significance should be further investigated.  Only in this way would the 
examination of substantial novelty be an economically rational test of 
patentability.92  Such an interpretation amounts to a significant distortion of 
patent law as lawyers have traditionally understood it. 
But the most fundamental deformation of the legal institution of patents 
by a law-and-economics reconceptualization is the elimination of the person 
of the inventor in all these models.  Here, a complete “defamiliarisation” of 
reality takes place to arrive at a workable model.  But then claims about 
phenomena in reality nevertheless are made on the basis of findings that result 
from entirely artificial model assumptions.  Law-and-economics analysis 
seems to take, as the starting point, the patent owner as the rational actor on 
the market.93  But in order to create the product in question, the patentable 
invention, one needs an inventor.  The inventor is always and necessarily a 
human being.94  The patent owner may not be, and normally will not be, a 
human being; it is typically a company.  The inventor is either an employee-
inventor, so patent ownership vests directly with the company as the 
patentee,95 or the patent owner is assignee of the inventor as the original 
patentee.  A legal entity cannot invent on its own; it needs the inventor.  
However, all law-and-economics model elements of economic rationality, 
such as the incentive to invest efficiently and to maximise the value of the 
patent or to have a reduction of costs for maintaining control over technology, 
really have corporate enterprises in mind, and the analytical assumptions may 
be important to them only.  But inventors who are individual human beings 
would consider these criteria as hardly relevant.  If it were otherwise, then this 
would indicate a somewhat sociopathic personality, given that efficiency-
maximising criteria are rather one-dimensional.96  For an inventor, the 
incentive to invent is usually completely different and is based on 
 
92.  See Kitch, supra note 88, at 284. 
93.  See Kitch, supra note 88, at 266, 276; see also Dam, supra note 83, at 247. 
94.  This is different from the trademark: the goodwill that the trademark denotes can be 
created by the endeavour of a corporation.  The input by an individual human being is confined to the 
design of the trademark itself, but in trademark law this is not the relevant subject of protection.   
95.  In the U.K. under the Patents Act 1977, s. 39 (1). 
96.  It cannot be discussed here whether only a company and legal person can fulfill the 
rational criteria of economic efficiency in this context, because a physical human being would have 
to have, or would benefit greatly from, a sociopathic personality to be able to conform.  See generally 
Gregory A. Daneke, Regulation and the Sociopathic Firm, 10(1) THE ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT 
REVIEW 16–17 (1985) on the “sociopathic firm.”  On the “corporate psychopath” (manager), see 
Clive Boddy, The impact of corporate psychopaths on corporate reputation and marketing, 12(1) 
THE MARKETING REVIEW 80 (2012).  On the related question of corporate social responsibility as a 
means to obtain a reputation for good behaviour (relevant is the reputation), see Crouch, supra note 
17, at 142. 
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unpredictable creativity and other sociological and psychological motives, 
which an economic model cannot emulate.97 Scientific interest and curiosity, 
advance of scholarship and knowledge, general philanthropic desire to 
improve the human condition, personal fame, and, perhaps, promotion in the 
company hierarchy are far more likely to be motivating factors for inventing. 
Sometimes, an invention is unintended and the outcome of sheer luck.98 It is 
difficult to see the relevance of a law-and-economics analysis of patent law if 
the inventor, the essential originator of the very subject-matter of the analysis, 
the patentable invention, is disregarded completely. Here, we have already a 
case of a ‘dead rat’ approach; that is, scientific analysis is attempted on the 
basis of a simplifying model that disproportionally distorts reality. If 
implemented, it may influence the law disadvantageously, since law is a 
normative, and not a positive/objective, science (unlike Newtonian physics).99  
So, the explanatory value of the findings on the basis of such a model is very 
limited. Their practical relevance for policy decisions de lege ferenda is 
highly doubtful, and their implementation is undesirable because they rest on 
incorrect premises. 
V.  COPYRIGHT 
The “dead rat” approach seems to characterise most of the law-and-
economics analysis of copyright.  But, strangely, or perhaps because of that, 
law-and-economics representatives show a particular interest in copyright.100  
Here again, Landes and Posner are the principal authors who attempted a 
reconceptualisation of copyright for their analysis.  It is difficult to provide a 
short account of their analysis without being accused of making distorting 
omissions.  This is a particular concern here because the law-and-economics 
approach transforms the institution of copyright beyond recognition from a 
lawyer’s perspective (probably to be able to deal with the particular 
complexities that characterise copyright).  How is one supposed to understand 
a statement such as “[t]he more that the cost of expression rises as z101 
 
97.  See Boulding, supra note 4, at 4 (economics as such does not contribute much to the 
formal study of human learning), see also Kahnemann, supra note 65, at 166. 
98.  For assessing whether there is inventive step, it is irrelevant whether the inventor thought 
he had made an invention.  For the U.K., see British United Shoe Manufacturers v. Fussell [1908] 25 
RPC 631, at 652. 
99.  For a brief instructive discussion of the difference between economics and the disciplines 
of history, sociology, and the natural sciences, see, e.g., Streissler, supra note 10, at 75–76. 
100.  Posner, supra note 55, at 57: “The emphasis is on copyright law, which, perhaps 
because of its complex legal structure and the relative neglect by economists of the arts and 
entertainment, has tended to be slighted in the conventional economic analysis of intellectual 
property.”  Id.  See also Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 325. 
101.  In the formal model, Landes & Posner provide for copyright, z, is the level of copyright 
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increases (that is, the greater is Ez102), the lower will be the optimal degree of 
copyright protection.”103  No lawyer thinks like that, but that is exactly the 
decisive point: copyright needs law and lawyers for its existence and 
application, not economists.  Here, one has a good example of what Coase 
cautioned against: “It by no means follows that an approach developed to 
explain behaviour in the economic system will be equally successful in the 
other social sciences,” and “[u]tility theory seems more likely to handicap 
than to aid economists in their work in contiguous disciplines.”104 
For Landes and Posner, the factors that determine the number of 
copyright-protected works created are the costs of producing the work.  These 
costs have two components: the first is the “cost of expression” (cost of 
creating the work: the author’s time and effort plus the cost of the publisher 
for editing, typesetting), and the second is the “cost of printing and 
distributing individual copies.”  The second component rises with the number 
of copies, while the cost of expression is unaffected by these and is a fixed 
cost.  In their model, Landes and Posner remove the distinction between 
author and publisher and treat them both as the same for cost calculation 
purposes.  They then discuss the possible relevance to their model of the facts 
that, among other things, (a) copies may be of inferior quality and not a 
perfect substitute for the original, (b) copying takes time, so there will be an 
interval during which the original publisher will not face competition, (c) 
there are contractual alternatives to copyright protection for limiting copying, 
and (d) authors derive substantial benefits from publication that are beyond 
any royalties (self-advertising, prestige, e.g. in case of academics).105 
These assumptions have several fundamental flaws: authors and 
publishers are radically different actors, both in the conception of copyright 
law and as economic actors on the market.106  It is difficult to see how an 
analysis, which disregards this aspect, can arrive at satisfactory results. 
The next problem is the practical assessment of the cost of expression and 
cost of production.  This is particularly true of the cost of expression: what is 
 
protection, whereby z ≥ 0, z = 0 denotes no copyright protection.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 
333. 
102.  Ez seems to denote the aggregate of the author’s costs (or total cost) of expression ez, but 
I cannot guarantee this.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 334, 341, which may enlighten or 
confuse the reader further in this regard. 
103.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 344. 
104.  Coase, supra note 15, at 208. 
105.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326–327, 329–331. 
106.  Otherwise there would be no point in distinguishing between authorship and ownership 
in copyright law and in having rules on license or assignment of copyright which presuppose author 
and publisher at the opposite sides of the bargain.  See CDPA 1988, ss. 9, 11, 90 (U.K.).  See 
17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a) & (d). 
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the author’s time and effort? The two hours for writing a poem, or the skill 
acquired for writing poetry over a period of twenty years that enables the poet 
to write a poem in just two hours?107  This approach is essentially shaped 
according to neo-classical microeconomic partial analysis, and, therefore, 
suffers from the time-disregarding extreme reduction of possible factors that 
may be acceptable for ‘conventional’ economic problems but not for a 
description of legal institutions. Some adaptation to the model will also have 
to be made in view of the development of digital technology in the area of 
reproduction and publication.  In particular, digital copies are a perfect 
substitute for the original today. 
The postulated second cost component, the cost of printing and 
distribution (together with the concerns about the quality of copies, etc.), is 
also startling.  One cannot help thinking that this is rather an issue of personal 
(moveable) property law regarding the object and not regarding the copyright 
it embodies; it concerns the physical copy of the book, not the copyright of 
the literary work.  Leaving aside the question of a too narrow focus on books 
as almost the only type of copyright-protected works discussed, the cost 
involved in the production of the physical thing really relates to the physical 
thing108 and is presumably irrelevant to the reconceptualisation of the legal 
institution of copyright with methods deriving from economics.  Other 
assumptions, for example, that authors derive substantial benefits beyond 
royalties from publication (positive externalities perhaps) are highly 
conjectural and also problematic.  The example given, the benefits of an 
academic because of his/her publications as self-advertisement, is not a 
convincing one, because self-advertisement really happens through talks at 
conferences and various administrative duties that confer a profile outside the 
academic’s department or university.109 
The law-and-economics model also posits that if the cost of expression 
becomes too high, it becomes counterproductive to produce copyright-
protected works.  The less extensive copyright protection is, the lower are the 
costs of creating a new work because the author can draw more freely from 
previous works.  This leads to the concept of the idea/expression 
 
107.  For further potentially relevant points for this calculation, see RAHMATIAN, supra note 
26, at 93. 
108.  From a property theorist’s and copyright lawyer’s perspective, the physical copy 
represents, but does not constitute, the copyright in question.  For further discussion, see Rahmatian, 
supra note 26, at 15–19. 
109.  On the identities of the “manager-academic,” see ROSEMARY DEEM ET AL., 
KNOWLEDGE, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND THE NEW MANAGERIALISM: THE CHANGING 
MANAGEMENT OF UK UNIVERSITIES 102–25 (2007). 
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dichotomy110: granting the author copyright protection in ideas would increase 
the cost of expression of later authors without generating offsetting 
benefits.111  That may appear plausible, but only if one disregards the 
problematic nature of “cost of expression”.  Further questionable statements 
follow; ideas are apparently acquired by the author “at zero cost.”  Landes and 
Posner also think that most works of fiction anyone would want to copy are 
intended for a mass audience and therefore have to operate with stock 
characters and situations (that is, ideas in the sense of copyright law) in order 
to be understood.112  But in fact, ideas are rarely acquired at zero cost; one 
only has to think about the research cost of a historic novel or of a non-fiction 
book—both of which attract copyright as literary works.  Furthermore, the 
controversial aesthetic assumption about works of fiction directed at a mass 
audience is an irrelevant consideration for copyright protection and the 
operation of the idea/expression dichotomy.  But, there is a more fundamental 
methodological objection, which the discussion of the idea/expression 
dichotomy highlights.  We find, here, an economic explanation of a legal rule 
that presupposes the legal rule itself for its explanation, so there is a petitio 
principii; the proposition lies already in the premise.  What is an 
unprotectable idea and what is protectable expression is a normative decision 
of copyright law (implemented by the courts in each case), not a factual 
observation.113  So the law determines the economic parameters that are 
supposed to model the law according to economic criteria.  If economics is 
supposed to be descriptive, then we also have a logically incorrect conclusion 
from an “is” (economic modelling) to an “ought” (law), and conversely.114 
The whole law-and-economics analysis is riddled with similar 
methodological flaws.  An example is the discussion of derivative works, also 
a normative definition of the law,115 that is presupposed to model an economic 
assumption but, at the same time, defined by economic methods.  The 
definition offered by Landes and Posner is that “the derivative work is an 
 
110.  U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], art. 9(2); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 
99 (1879); Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers, Ltd., [1938] 1 Ch. 106, at 110; CJEU in Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace v. Svaz softwarové ochrany v. Ministerstvo kultury [2011] FSR 18 (Case C-
393/09), ¶¶ 48–50. 
111.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 332–33, 349–50.  
112.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 349–50.  See also Posner, supra note 55, at 65. 
113.  See, e.g., Rahmatian, supra note 26, at 125-130, with examples from case law. 
114.  Sometimes referred to as Hume’s law.  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby–Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1960) (1739–40). 
115.  17 U.S.C. § 101 “derivative work.”  In the U.K.: “adaptation.”  CDPA 1988, § 21(3) 
(U.K.). 
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imperfect substitute,”116 which conflates, from a copyright perspective, the 
categories of “copy” and “derivative work”, the latter being capable of 
attracting copyright in its own right.  Another obvious candidate for a law-
and-economics analysis is the “fair use” defence, again a concept that is 
defined and shaped by the law only,117 and differently so in different 
jurisdictions (for example, “fair dealing” in U.K. copyright law is a concept 
within the permitted acts that is defined differently from US copyright law118).  
Landes and Posner postulate that fair use reduces transaction costs because 
there is no need to obtain a license (at a potentially high cost) from the 
copyright owner.  A fair use privilege creates a clear benefit to the user A, but 
no harm to the copyright holder B.119  However, if one applies the Coase 
Theorem, which is supposed to stand at the beginning of all these law-and-
economics considerations of property rights, then it rather appears that B has a 
cost and suffers harm, and the question is really reciprocal whether A is 
allowed to harm B, or conversely, so the problem is to avoid the more serious 
harm.120  This becomes particularly apparent in the case of parodies, which 
Landes and Posner do discuss121 but not against the background of this aspect. 
The optional term of copyright protection has been the subject of several 
law-and-economics examinations.122  Copyright protection should be limited 
in time to be efficient.  Copyright should also be time-limited to save on 
tracing costs and transaction costs; too lengthy terms of protection invite rent-
seeking.123  A time-limitation shall augment the public domain because future 
authors can borrow from these earlier works that are no longer protected.  
However, there also seem to be economic benefits in long copyright terms.  
Posner gives the example of the Mickey Mouse, which, if it were in the public 
domain, would lead to a “surfeit of copies” that “might produce a net 
reduction in the market value of the character if overexposure induced a 
degree of boredom or even disgust that caused, via a downward shift in the 
demand curve, a decline in total utility.”124  It is not convincing that such 
essentially arbitrary aesthetic value judgments should be allowed to determine 
 
116.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 354.  
117.  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
118.  For a brief contrasting overview, see J. ADRIAN L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 
541, 547 (3d ed. 2008). 
119.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 357. 
120.  Coase, supra note 16, at 2. 
121.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 359.  See also Posner, supra note 55, at 62–64. 
122.  See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 361; William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 471 (2003). 
123.  Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 362.  See Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, supra 
note 122, at 477–478, 483, for various qualifying arguments. 
124.  Posner, supra note 55, at 61. 
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the level and length of copyright protection.  Could one not also feel sated 
with the Mickey Mouse character because of the type or quality of the art in 
question or the over-advertising and over-promotion by the copyright holders 
to increase profits?  Does one have enough of Bach or Paul Klee because they 
are in the public domain? 
The law-and-economics modelling of copyright distorts this legal 
institution exceptionally strongly, so it is really an extreme case of a “dead 
rat” approach.  One also notes, especially with regard to copyright but already 
also in the case of patents, that the economic conceptualisation of intellectual 
property rights focuses only on the property and its characteristics, but not on 
the creator, the author, and the inventor.  He or she is merely implicitly 
regarded as the property maker and then eliminated from further analysis.125  
Important is the product and its economic utility, not how it comes into 
existence; unlike with tangible goods that must come from somewhere (at 
least as raw material), intellectual property originates from a mental act.  
Without its human designer, the object of economic examination does not 
come into existence in the first place.  So the creator and the parameters of the 
creation are important for any scientific analysis.  The law-and-economics 
approach ushers in a commodification of the human being by equating 
property maker and property in a reductionist model.126 
VI.  THE RELEVANCE OR IRRELEVANCE OF A LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND 
MORAL CONSEQUENCES 
Even if all assumptions and conditions in a law-and-economics analysis 
are corrected and adapted satisfactorily, economic considerations are, by 
definition, essentially irrelevant for the lawyer.  More precisely, when the 
lawyer takes economic considerations into account, he or she means 
something else than the economist.  The reason is that law and economics 
have an entirely different institutional framework, methodology, and 
understanding of human society, so that the criteria for decision-making are 
necessarily different in nature.  This is even so where the results of a legal and 
an economic exploration may be similar in some cases; the similarity is a 
phenotypic, not a genotypic, one. 
This can be demonstrated already with Coase’s seminal article at the 
 
125.  As in the Landes & Posner model that ignores the distinction between costs incurred by 
authors and by publishers for simplification of analysis.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 327. 
126.  This is particularly ominous in the case of copyright.  See RAHMATIAN, supra note 26, 
at 231, 253.  
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beginning of the law-and-economics movement.127  Coase’s economic 
analysis of nuisance cases provides a good example of the fundamental and 
irremediable flaw of a law-and-economics approach to legal institutions and 
decisions.  The problem in situations of nuisance, according to Coase, has 
traditionally been obscured by the law.  When A inflicts harm on B, the 
question is not how to restrain A, but to regard the problem as a reciprocal 
one.  Were A restrained, he would suffer harm, so one should really ask: is A 
allowed to harm B, or is B allowed to harm A?  The cost of exercising a right 
is always a loss suffered elsewhere as a consequence of the exercise of that 
right.128 
Coase demonstrates this problem with some nuisance law decisions, 
among them the ruling in the English case of Sturges v. Bridgman,129 a 
landmark case in the English law of nuisance.130  In this case, a confectioner 
used two mortars and pestles for breaking up loaf-sugar for the operation of 
his business, which was in the same position for more than 60 years.  A 
physician moved to the house next door and later erected a consulting room at 
the end of his garden that shared a wall with the confectioner’s kitchen.  The 
noise and vibration of the confectioner’s mortars and pestles seriously 
disturbed the doctor during the consultations of his patients, especially when 
he wanted to listen to the patients’ chest with a stethoscope.  The doctor 
brought an action for nuisance against the confectioner, and won in both 
instances, because there was an actionable nuisance from the time when the 
doctor built a consulting room, something he was entitled to do as property 
owner.  The confectioner was ordered by injunction to stop the use of his 
machinery.131 
Coase criticises that the judges should have taken into account the 
question whether the continued use of the machine adds more to the 
confectioner’s income than it subtracts from the doctor’s.  The decision of the 
court simply presupposed the case in which the costs of carrying out the 
necessary market transactions exceeded the gain, which might be achieved by 
any rearrangement of rights.  The preservation of the area for residential and 
professional use is only desirable if the value of the additional residential 
facilities obtained was greater than the value of the confectioner’s products 
(cakes, etc.) lost.  It would have been better to consider the possibility of a 
bargain; whether the doctor would have been willing to waive his right and 
 
127.  Coase, supra note 16, at 1-44. 
128.  Id. at 2, 44. 
129.  Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] L.R. 11 Ch.D. 852 (U.K.). 
130.  Coase, supra note 16, at 8–10. 
131.  Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] L.R. 11 Ch.D. at 855, 859, 865–66. 
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allow the machinery to continue to operate if the confectioner would have 
paid him a sum of money, which was greater than the loss of income because 
the doctor would have to reduce his consultations or move to a more 
expensive or less convenient area.  One can test this argument by assuming 
what would have happened if the confectioner had won.  In that case, there 
would have been the opportunity for a bargain, whereby the doctor would 
have had to pay the confectioner to stop using his machinery.132 
From a lawyer’s and court’s perspective, Coase’s considerations are 
mostly beside the point.  Many rights in law, including property rights, are 
absolute and not subject to a bargain of parties, specifically not to an ex post 
bargain of parties.133  This is particularly true of criminal law and rights 
arising out of a tort.  If a very capable and highly regarded chief executive A 
of a large company knocks over a two-year old child B with his car and kills 
it, the law does not evaluate A’s liability on whether the cost of having A sent 
to prison and having him made to pay damages exceeds the cost the death of 
B entails.  This is even so if one considers that A is an influential and very 
skilled businessman who would be hindered to give his services to his 
company, the market, and the business community (at least temporarily) and 
to increase wealth, while B is a small child who does not yet contribute to the 
production of anything valuable and can be replaced relatively easily and 
fairly fast by growing a new child for two years (and nine months).  An 
economic bargain-oriented approach would perhaps advocate that A pays the 
parents of B an amount of money that covers the reinstatement costs for a new 
child, and in turn A would not have to spend time in prison and pay damages 
(beyond the cost bargained for) because that would produce negative 
externalities (cost) that go beyond the loss of the child; the company would be 
deprived of the expertise of its chief executive (and the chief executive may 
be financially crippled by a too onerous damages claim).  The company, as a 
result, may suffer losses in business and have to make staff redundant and so 
on.  The law fortunately decides deliberately against such economic 
considerations. 
The same applies to nuisance cases.  In Sturges v. Bridgman, the question 
was not whether the continued use of the machine adds more to the 
confectioner’s income than it subtracts from the doctor’s.  The question is, for 
the lawyer, and that is the only relevant question, whether the confectioner’s 
activity amounts to nuisance and whether this activity is tolerable or not from 
 
132.  Coase, supra note 16, at 9–10. 
133.  Every contract may prepare a change of rights, also a change of allocation of property 
rights, but once the contract is concluded, no further “bargain” (from a law-and-economics 
perspective) is accepted, only if all parties agree to renegotiate pro futuro.   
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a legal, ethical, sociological, and psychological point of view, where 
economics may come in but most commonly plays a very minor part.  
Whether there is nuisance has to be considered in the context of its 
occurrence, especially its geographical context;134 a cost-benefit analysis of 
the value of the additional residential facilities relative to the value of 
products as a result of commercial use cannot become a decisive factor.  Here, 
perhaps for the reason of a continued provision of healthcare, the unimpeded 
existence of a doctor’s surgery was considered as more important for the 
community at issue than the carrying on of certain activities within a 
confectioner’s business.  The detriment the community suffers is arguably 
greater if it is the result of the relocation of a physician (who provides 
essential services) than of a confectioner (who provides non-essential 
products that can be transported to different places). 
The law obviously recognises, enables, and protects bargains, or 
contractual arrangements, but, as a look into Sturges v. Bridgman shows, the 
lawyer understands “bargain” differently from the economist.  The courts 
considered the possibility of a bargain between the doctor and the 
confectioner: 
When you find a man doing an act which is a manifest injury to 
another . . .  and his neighbour allows that to go on for a great number 
of years, it is not unreasonable to presume that he did it under some 
right. If he has done it openly and his neighbour does not 
complain . . . it is not unreasonable to suppose that they did come to 
terms at some antecedent period for granting a right.135 
The difference to Coase’s bargain is that, here, the possibility of the 
existence of a previous right created by a contract is debated which would 
then manifest itself by the confectioner’s behaviour.  But it would have been a 
prior bargain, so the tort (nuisance) would not have arisen because the activity 
would have been lawful.  It is not a Coase-bargain, which is an ex post 
attempt at an economic redress of an extant state of affairs, here after the tort 
of nuisance has already been committed.  In law, such ex post ‘bargains’ are 
not an instance of a negotiable trade-off, but a corruption of the idea of 
justice.  It is characteristic that a great deal of the argumentation in Sturges v. 
Bridgman centres around the question whether the confectioner could claim 
an easement to justify the use of the machinery.  In this way, a restricted prior 
property right (even prior to the doctor’s later building of the consulting 
 
134.  Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] L.R. 11 Ch.D. 852 (U.K.) at 865–66.   
135.  Id. at 859. 
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room), granted as a result of a prior contract or ‘bargain’ or by prescription 
(that is, by operation of law), could have been found that could have made his 
activity lawful.  There was, however, no easement because noise is not 
capable of being the subject-matter of an easement; the neighbour had no 
chance to interrupt this activity physically from his own land, which, in turn, 
would have prevented the easement from arising against him by prescription.  
He would have had to go onto the neighbour’s land to interfere with the 
neighbour’s noisy business, and that would have been trespass.136 
Coase does not address the easement aspect at all, although the discussion 
by Thesinger LJ would have highlighted the difference between legal and 
economic balancing of reasons very well.  If the neighbour cannot prevent the 
noisy activity without trespassing and cannot bring an action before the noisy 
activity has started to prevent it from happening, no right to noise and 
vibration—especially in form of an easement—can arise against the 
neighbour; it is “in a very high degree unreasonable and undesirable” that 
there should be a right of action for acts which are not currently happening (so 
there is as yet no nuisance), and “it is in an equal degree unjust, and from a 
public point of view, inexpedient that the use and value of the adjoining land 
should . . . be restricted . . . by reason of the continuance of acts incapable of 
physical interruption.”137  The negation of this principle would lead to greater 
individual hardship than the application of this principle.138  A cost-benefit 
analysis or a weighing of the cost as a result of the harm to A or to B does not 
feature at all and would be out of place; the criteria are whether the ruling is 
“just” and “expedient” from a point of view of public interest, and whether 
the effects are “reasonable” and “desirable”.  Anyone who doubts the 
exactitude of these terms will readily agree that the term “efficiency” in 
economics is equally opaque. 
The concerns raised in the context of the relatively simple tort of nuisance 
apply, a fortiori, to the much more complex intellectual property rights.139  
The present discussion of copyright law reform in the U.K. after the 
Hargreaves Review (2011)140 shows how damaging a law-and-economics 
analysis of legal principles and values can be.  The Hargreaves Review is full 
of law-and-economics considerations or at least makes extensive use of their 
 
136.  Id. at 856, 863, 865. 
137.  Id. at 865. 
138.  Id. at 865–866. 
139.  These are also close to torts because their protection (infringement) is tortuous 
(trespassory) in nature.  For further discussion and references, see RAHMATIAN, supra note 26, at 
23–24. 
140.  IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND GROWTH, (May 2011), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf. 
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jargon.141  One suggestion of the Hargreaves Review was the introduction of a 
copyright defence for parody, and the Review noted that “there is an 
economic link.  Video parody is today becoming part and parcel of the 
interactions of private citizens, often via social networking sites, and 
encourages literacy in multimedia expression in ways that are increasingly 
essential to the skills base of the economy. Comedy is big business.”142  
Following the Hargreaves Review, the Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committee of the U.K. Parliament recommended in its Report (2012)143 that 
before such an exception for parody is introduced, 
[T]here should be a closer examination of certain economic issues 
including, possibly: (i) the actual transactional costs involved in 
negotiating licenses; (ii) the comparison between those costs and the 
anticipated benefits; (iii) how much creative activity is actually stifled 
by the current legal situation; and (iv) what proportion of parody cases 
might lead to an allegation of moral rights infraction, and what the 
costs of resulting disputes would be.144 
The Committee recommends that “the Government give due weight to 
economic data on the potential benefits and disadvantages of implementing a 
parody exception.”145  In fact, only (iii) is of relevance to the lawyer, and (iv) 
only without the consideration of the costs of resulting disputes, because one 
cannot abolish or restrict a right (freedom of expression) just with the 
economic argument that an exercise of this right would cause costs of 
resulting disputes.  However, (i) and (ii) should have a very inferior role in 
legal policy considerations.  The most important concerns, here, would be the 
rights of freedom of expression, freedom of criticism, freedom from 
censorship, and freedom of the arts, and these rights may often operate 
directly and deliberately against economic interests.146  An economic 
 
141.  Andreas Rahmatian, The Hargreaves Review on copyright licensing and exceptions: a 
missed moment of opportunity, 22(8) ENT. L REV., 221–22 (2011), with further references in the 
Hargreaves Review to illustrate this point, and emphasising and criticizing this approach of the 
Hargreaves Review. 
142.  HARGREAVES, supra note 140, at 50. 
143.  BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE-FIRST REPORT, The Hargreaves 
Review of Intellectual Property: Where Next? (June 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/367/36702.htm. 
144.  Id. ¶¶ 42. 
145.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
146.  For a discussion on the relationship between the neo-classicist market paradigm and 
democracy-enhancing goals in the context of parody and fair use, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 324–36 (1996–97). 
RAHMATIAN FORMATTED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/24/2013  1:56 PM 
222 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 17:2 
 
argument would have a deeply corrupting effect on the law by replacing 
justice with efficiency.147  The Committee’s insistence on economic data on 
the potential benefits and disadvantages before a decision in favour or against 
a parody exception is also likely to delay any reform considerably, and it 
creates the wrong impression that a defence would allow parodies for the first 
time in the U.K. (and only if they do not harm unduly the market of right 
holders), as if parodies were not already lawful in principle today.  Parodies 
have been recognised in case law because a parody does not amount to 
infringement at all148 or because it could also be acceptable under the general 
copyright defence of fair dealing for criticism and review.149  It rather appears 
that a new statutory defence specifically for parody would be restricted to 
economically “efficient” cases, while the current common law defence is free 
from such considerations. 
One can see that the purpose of law differs radically from the purpose of 
economics.  The purpose of commercial law is to provide authoritative 
solutions for conflicts by determining rights and obligations and allocating 
them to the parties of the conflict, typically in court, as the nuisance case 
above has illustrated.  There is in law no “market” and no “competition”; 
these may be phenomena to which the law may refer, especially in rules 
regulating these (antitrust laws, etc.), and here also not guided by purely 
economic concerns.  But “market” and “competition” are not a constitutive 
part of the normative framework of the law.  When the court in Sturges v. 
Bridgman stated that, by applying its decision, it allowed individual cases of 
hardship to avoid individual cases of greater hardship, it acted against any 
idea in economics of a market and market equilibrium in perfect competition.  
Different from law, economics can be defined as the science studying the 
general methods by which men co-operate to meet their material needs, or, 
more restrictively, the study of allocation of physical resources and the 
determination of prices in the economy.150  The direction of economics may 
 
147.  ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE LAW 
85–86 (Saskia Brown trans., 2007); CROUCH, supra note 17, at 63–64. 
148.  This is because the parody does not amount to a substantial part of the work it satirises.  
See Glyn v. Weston Feature Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 261; Joy Music Ltd. v. Sunday Pictorial Newspaper 
(1920) Ltd., [1960] 2 EWHC (QB) 60. 
149.  CDPA 1988, s. 30(1) (U.K.).  There is some support for this view in Williamson Music 
Ltd. & Others v. The Pearson P’ship & Another, [1987] FSR 97, but it is unclear whether parodies 
would (always) fall under this section.  On the problematic basis of § 30(1) for parodies, see Ronan 
Deazley, Copyright and Parody: Taking Backward the Gowers Review, 73 MOD. L. REV. 785, 789–
91 (2010). 
150.  VELJANOVSKI, supra note 2, at 18, with several definitions.  A brief generally accepted 
definition is: “Economics is the study of how society manages its scarce resources.”  MANKIW, supra 
note 40, at 4. 
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overlap with that of law in some aspects, e.g. regarding the “allocation of 
physical resources”, but with a different starting point and a completely 
different scientific interest.  Furthermore, it is the law that transforms physical 
resources into the concept of property and so creates the necessary 
preconditions for the operation of markets and the economy as a whole.  
There can be law without economics, but there cannot be economics without 
law.  Economic efficiency, the cornerstone of economic analysis, is 
essentially irrelevant for lawyers and judges when they have to ascertain the 
existence or extent of a right.  Thus, an economic model is necessarily unable 
to conceptualise and so emulate the law and the relationship the law creates 
between people and legal institutions.  Economic models may be able to give 
a limited explanation of markets and changes of markets as a result of legal 
intervention and regulation, but they cannot explain the nature and effects of 
legal rules themselves.151 
A further point of criticism is the incomplete picture of the human agent 
in economics that economic theory provides: he is rational, selfish, and his 
tastes do not change.  Modern research in psychology and behavioural 
economics has qualified this standard assumption considerably.152  To a 
limited extent, some of these discoveries start finding their way into economic 
theories of intellectual property, such as the relevance of the endowment 
effect to the valuing of intellectual property rights by economically rational 
actors.153 
But even these corrections, commendable as they are, cannot remove the 
basic conceptual problem.  The essence of Coase’s analysis of legal conflicts 
(for example with regard to nuisance) is the opportunity to buy oneself out of 
legal obligations that have already arisen, sometimes by previous agreement 
and sometimes by operation of law, and so without the consent or even 
knowledge of the economic actor(s) concerned.  This opportunity is 
determined by cost-benefit considerations to maximise efficiency.  That 
approach has not surprisingly been characterised as “immoral”, not only, as 
one would expect, because of human rights concerns, but also from a 
libertarian viewpoint, because such an opportunity to a “bargain” would 
undermine the very essence of property rights that apply erga omnes.  If in a 
“bargain” anyone could buy himself out of an obligation that another’s 
property right imposes on him, then we would not really have a property right 
 
151.  RAHMATIAN, supra note 26, at 95. 
152.  Kahneman, supra note 65, at 162, 165–166. 
153.  See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Springman, Valuing Intellectual 
Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1–45 (2010), based on the research by Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1325, 1325–48 (1990).  See also ZERBE, supra note 34, at 44. 
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system at all.154  It has therefore been argued that “we must reject Coase’s 
advice because it is just plain downright immoral.  It is evil and vicious to 
violate our most cherished and precious property rights in an ill conceived 
attempt to maximise the monetary value of production.”155  These are strong 
words, but one will probably start considering them sympathetically at least 
when one looks at some of the law-and-economics discussion of clearly 
illegal bargains, which are, from an economic perspective, apparently entirely 
rational.  Furthermore, law-and-economics protagonists seem to examine 
these illegal transactions without embarrassment and without even raising the 
serious fact of illegality and moral reprehensibility if these scientific model 
assumptions were mirrored in the real world.156 
For example, Demsetz illustrated the way in which property rights 
internalise externalities with the case of slavery.  If a law establishes the right 
of a person to his freedom, this also necessitates, according to Demsetz, a 
payment on the part of a firm or of the taxpayer sufficient to cover the cost of 
using that person’s labour if his services are to be obtained.  On the other 
hand, “a law which gives the firm or the taxpayer clear title to slave labour 
would necessitate that the slave-owners take into account the sums that slaves 
are willing to pay for their freedom.”157  What is really the only rational 
consideration here is that the law needs to intervene remedially in the 
perversions of economic analysis and prohibit certain types of transactions 
outright, irrespective of any economic concerns.  Critics of the law-and-
economics interpretation of property rights should perhaps be less concerned 
about the integrity of property, but rather about the integrity of the human 
being.  This is something law-and-economics approaches by virtue of their 
model assumptions do not regard as relevant, while lawyers arguably see that 
as the highest purpose of legal rules, at least in a democratic society.158  The 
more personal nature of intellectual property rights (particularly of patents 
and copyright), when compared to tangible commodities, emphasises this 
idea. 
 
154.  Walter Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 
111, 112 (1977). 
155.  Block, supra note 152, at 114–115 (original emphasis). 
156.  For a discussion on the question of deontological constraints, which would counteract 
such considerations, see, for example, Larry Alexander, Deontological Constraints in a 
Consequentialist World: A Comment on Law, Economics and Morality, 3 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL 
STUD. 75, 75 (2011). 
157.  Demsetz, supra note 48, at 349. 
158.  See also Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law and Economics Moral?—Humanistic Economics 
and a Classical Liberal Critique of Posner’s Economic Analysis, in ADAM SMITH AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 160 (Robin Paul Malloy & Jerry Evensky eds., 1995). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
The law-and-economics analysis interprets legal rules and institutions 
with the methodology of economics and so transforms them into 
unrecognisable artefacts.  This is particularly so with regard to intellectual 
property law: while in the case of trademarks law-and-economics analysis is 
merely too simplistic and mostly superfluous, in the cases of patents and 
particularly copyright, it is positively harmful to these legal institutions.  
Economic methodology has not been developed for the analysis of law, and 
the purpose of legal methodology is not the scientific exploration of economic 
efficiency.  The “economic” analysis of intellectual property rights can be 
likened to a “dead rat” approach in a laboratory: entirely artificial model 
assumptions kill the object of research for simplification purposes and then 
analyse scientifically the dead object as if it were alive in its natural habitat.  
Law-and-economics distinguishes itself from economics in that it essentially 
rejects the pluralism of models, which is characteristic of the discipline of 
economics.  It also sets itself apart from law in that it discards the possibility 
of legal argument and, if in judicial proceedings, appeal because it presents 
itself as a kind of natural science discovering immutable natural laws that 
cannot be, by nature, subject to appeal and redress.  So law-and-economics is 
not a potentially falsifiable scientific theory but a belief system that seeks to 
remove itself from critical enquiry.  The idea of the all-embracing free market 
with its own consistent laws as the ultimate foundation and limit of the legal 
universe has religious overtones. 
Furthermore, it is hard to understand why law-and-economics builds on 
the individualistic microeconomic short-time orientation of neo-classical 
economics (with emphasis on demand) instead of relying on the 
macroeconomic long-term analysis159 (with emphasis on supply) to explore 
principles of political economy,160 which characterises classical economics, 
that is, the era of economic thought from Adam Smith to (and arguably 
 
159.  On the absence of macroeconomics in law-and-economics analysis, see Kelman, supra 
note 25, at 276, 283. 
160.  An early definition of the purpose of political economy by Sir James Steuart, Book I: Of 
Population and Agriculture (from: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OECONOMY), in 
THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT. AN ANTHOLOGY 402 (Alexander Broadie ed., 1997) (1st ed. 
1767): 
The principal object of this science [political economy] is to secure a certain fund of 
subsistence for all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may render it 
precarious; to provide every thing necessary for supplying the wants of the society, and to 
employ the inhabitants … in such a manner as naturally to create reciprocal relations and 
dependencies between them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply one 
another with their reciprocal wants. 
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including) Karl Marx.161  Lawyers are not normally interested in the 
individual behaviour at individual markets but in the legal framework that can 
create markets in general, whereby this legal concept must apply to all 
markets and actors in an equal manner, ultimately as a result of the idea of 
justice.  This subjection of a possible individual rule to the question whether it 
could be sustained for society in general is rather characteristic of legal 
thinking;162 one illustrative historical example is from the Scottish jurist and 
judge Lord Kames (Henry Home, 1696–1782), at one time the mentor of 
Adam Smith, about the possibility of the intervention of equity as an 
individual relief: 
However clear a just claim or defence may be, a court of equity ought 
not to interpose, unless the case can be brought under a general rule. 
No sort of oppression is more intolerable than what is done under the 
colour of law; and, for that reason, judges ought to be confined to 
general rules, the only method invented to prevent legal oppression.163 
Any meaningful analysis based on economic methodology that seeks to 
implement legal policy (at least ultimately) will probably have to adopt a 
more macroeconomic, long-term, non-individualistic approach without the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility and its variants. 
The scientific method of law-and-economics is fortified by “mathematical 
models”, which give the appearance of exact truth.  But those who apply these 
mathematical formulae tend to forget that these are as good as the quality of 
the data input, and there are virtually never measurable data in the context of 
legal reasoning.  This can be demonstrated already with the work that was the 
starting point for the law-and-economics movement: Coase’s discussion of the 
nuisance cases in his seminal paper on the problem of social cost in 1960.  
Relevant is not a trade-off, not an ex post “bargain”, the buying oneself out of 
existing obligations arising from tort or property in particular, but a decision 
concerning the allocation and defence of rights based on justice.  The law-
and-economics analysis seeks to replace justice with efficiency164 and in this 
way corrupts the law and the idea of justice. In this context, a rather 
 
161.  WILLIAM J. BARBER, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 17, 163 (1967). 
162.  Put broadly, economists seek to deduce rules from individual market behaviour which 
they believe are applicable generally in all markets, while lawyers decide whether an individual case 
should prompt them to create a rule; if so, such a rule must be accepted to be applicable generally to 
society as a whole. 
163.  LORD KAMES (HENRY HOME), PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 132 Vol. 2 (Rahmatian ed., 
Lawbook Exchange 2011) (1778). 
164.  SUPIOT, supra note 147, at 85. 
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unsophisticated notion of “justice” should suffice; any detailed discussion of 
the problem of a definition of “justice” and whether the purpose of the law is 
to realise justice, must be left to specialist works on legal theory,165 but 
provisionally one may rely on clear statements of some legal philosophers.166  
Law is obviously not tantamount to justice but is a principal means to bring 
about justice.  The currently popular postmodernist approach that questions 
the ability to pursue truth (and presumably also justice)167 is of no 
assistance.168 
A legal system, which gives way to the more economically powerful 
individuals and legal entities and allows them to buy themselves out of legal 
obligations for the purpose of their own wealth maximisation under the 
principle of efficiency increase, does not safeguard justice.  Justice is not the 
subject of a commercial bargain.169  For Adam Smith, the towering figure at 
 
165.  On philosophical and legal theories of justice, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 260–63, 265 (rev. ed. 1999); NIGEL E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE 9–
15 (3d ed. 2008), followed by part 1 of his book.  HERBERT L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 157–
67 (2d ed. 1997) (a prominent passage on justice and the law).  See also NEIL MACCORMICK, 
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 270–74 (2007) on the role of justice and the 
law.  “Law is morally loaded . . . and contains an implicit aspiration to justice.” Id. at 270.  On the 
generally accepted distinction between rule of law and justice, see, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law 
and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 211 (2d ed. 2009) 
(1979). 
166.  Particularly, legal philosophers of earlier times were rather undeterred from making 
bold statements about justice.  See, e.g., RUDOLF STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 24, 26 
(Ass’n Am. L. Sch. eds., Isaac Husik trans., 1925):  
All positive law is an attempt to be just law. . . . Law as a final end is the greatest injustice. 
Law is a condition and not a goal; a means, not an ultimate end. Whoever maintains and 
defends a specific legal rule with definite content as absolute, simply because it is legal, is 
guilty of an objectively unjust act of will. 
Obviously there are a few inaccuracies in these deductions, but this cannot be discussed here.  
More recently and also very straightforward, Mortimer Sellers, The Value and Purpose of Law, 33 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 150 (2003–04): “Legal systems properly exist for the purpose of giving right answers 
about justice. . . . Law is a theory of practical justice, and a legal system is a process for discovering 
and implementing the rules that justice requires.”  
167.  See, e.g., MAX TRAVERS, UNDERSTANDING LAW AND SOCIETY 146 (2010). 
168.  It may rather open up the opportunity to intellectual corruption under a scientific guise.  
This danger is not particular to postmodernism; Stammler’s views cited above did not prevent 
Stammler from joining one of the organisations of the NSDAP several years later.  Very instructive 
is Hannah Arendt’s 1964 interview about the intellectuals in 1933 in Germany.  See HANNAH 
ARENDT, THE PORTABLE HANNAH ARENDT 11 (Peter Baehr ed., 2003): “And among intellectuals 
Gleichschaltung was the rule, so to speak. But not among the others.  And I never forgot that. I left 
Germany dominated by the idea . . . . Never again!  I shall never again get involved in any kind of 
intellectual business.” 
169.  A commercial bargain can of course be conducted in line with justice. Compare ADAM 
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 86 (D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie eds., Clarendon 
Press 1976) (1759) [hereinafter THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS]:  
Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, form a sense of 
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the beginning of modern economics, justice, was central to the fabric of 
society: “Beneficence . . . is less essential to the existence of society than 
justice.  Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, 
without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it.”170 
When a cultural or aesthetic quality assessment is attempted, a law-and-
economics analysis can provide no insight at all.  But such considerations are 
particularly important for intellectual property.  As the writer Friedrich 
Dürrenmatt in the quote at the beginning of this article states, the fact that a 
writer can produce a commodity that sells says nothing about the quality of 
the writing. 
It is unclear where the law-and-economics belief in the market and in 
economics as the foundational science for law and possibly all phenomena of 
society derives from.  One root seems to be a kind of inverted Marxism,171 
perhaps a conservative response to it in the prevailing discourse of the 1960s.  
Law-and-economics shares with Marxism that it also seeks to relate each legal 
rule back to its economic determinants.172  The political history of the 
twentieth century illustrates graphically what twentieth-century versions of 
Marxism (or what called itself Marxism) could lead to when all humanist 
conceptions are ousted in favour of a one-dimensional and arid “economic” 
world view that has the desire to create a “new man.”  Friedrich Engels saw 
this problem coming and felt uneasy about it.  He wrote in a letter to Joseph 
Bloch, (September 21, 1890) in which he explained the meaning of historical 
materialism: 
According to the materialist view of history, the ultimately 
determining element in history is the production and reproduction of 
actual life.  More than that was never maintained either by Marx or 
myself.  Now if somebody distorts this by declaring that the economic 
element is the only determining factor, he transforms that proposition 
into a meaningless, abstract, absurd piece of jargon. . . . If some 
younger writers attribute more importance to the economic aspect than 
 
its utility, without any mutual love or affection, and though no man in it should owe any 
obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary 
exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation. 
170.  THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 169, at 86.  On Smith’s theory of 
justice, see John W. Cairns, Adam Smith and the Role of the Courts in Securing Justice and Liberty, 
in ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 36 (Robin Paul Malloy & Jerry 
Evensky eds., 1995). 
171.  Or a vulgar form of Marxism, with law as a “superstructure” based on economic 
rationality (although the Marxist economic rationality is a different one).  See Horwitz, supra note 
21, at 905. 
172.  SUPIOT, supra note 147, at 85.  See also Malloy, supra note 158, at 154. 
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is its due, Marx and I are to some extent to blame.  We had to stress 
this leading principle in the face of opponents who denied it, and we 
did not always have the time, space or opportunity to do justice to the 
other factors that interacted upon each other. But it was a different 
matter when it came to depicting a section of history, i.e. to applying 
the theory in practice, and here there was no possibility of error. 
Unfortunately people all too frequently believe they have mastered a 
new theory and can do just what they like with it as soon as they have 
grasped—not always correctly—its main propositions. And I cannot 
exempt from this reproach many of the more recent “Marxists,” and 
indeed, they have been responsible for some pretty peculiar stuff.173 
It is too idealistic to think that adherents of the Chicago School of Law-
and-Economics will start appreciating Friedrich Engels and will give up on 
the law-and-economics analysis of intellectual property law and law in 
general.  But if only the fear of being associated with the foremost socialist 
thinkers made them do so, then, from a consequentialist efficiency 
perspective, this would nevertheless be an achievement. 
 
 
 
173.  Friedrich Engels, Letter by Friedrich Engels to Joseph Bloch, London, 21–22 September 
1890, in KARL MARX, FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. 49 (Engels 1890–92) 34, 36 
(2001) (first publication 1895) (with slight alterations of the translation from the German by the 
author). 
